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ABSTRACT 
The post-crisis accountability process is a purification ritual that serves to channel public emotions 
and enables re-equilibration after a severe disturbance of the sociopolitical order. Crisis 
accountability literature can be reviewed in terms of forums, actors, and consequences. This setup 
allows a systematic discussion of how crises impact: the accountability process in influencing its 
setting (the forum); the strategies of accountees and their opponents (actors); and the resulting 
outcomes in terms of reputation damage, sanctions, and restoration (consequences). There is a clear 
distinction between formal and informal accountability forums, with the media being almost 
exclusively informal, and judicial forums, accident investigators, and political inquiries having formal 
authority over accountability assessments. Yet, through the presence of formal authorities in media 
reporting, and because media frames influence the work of formal authorities, the different forums 
intensively interact in accountability processes. Looking at accountability strategies reveals that the 
number of actors involved in blame games is likely rising because of increasingly networked crisis 
responses, and the role of actors has become more important and personal in the crisis aftermath 
and accountability process. The consequences and success of individual actors in influencing the 
accountability outcomes is shaped by both institutional settings and individual skills and strategies. A 
current political power position that exceeds prior mistakes is an effective shield, and denial is the 
least effective though most commonly used strategy. Accountability processes remain a balancing act 
between rebuttal and repair. Yet after major crisis, renewal is possible, and post-crisis accountability 
can play a crucial role therein. 
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Crises are commonplace in our societies, and regardless of their origin, they do more than threaten 
lives, critical infrastructures, and public or private properties. They also negatively impact citizens’ 
feelings on safety and protection that legitimated the preexisting political institutional order (Boin, ‘t 
Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005; Kuipers & ‘t Hart, 2014). Crisis management pertains to saving lives 
and restoring order at the scene of the incident but is also an activity that takes place within the top 
administrative and political structures. Events negatively affecting core functions in society are nearly 
all deemed unacceptable by key stakeholders, the media, and the public at large. As a consequence, 
crises trigger intense accountability processes, either focusing on the evaluation of performance at 
all levels of government in anticipating or responding to the crisis, or questioning shortcomings of 
the underlying institutional order. 
The post-crisis accountability process is a purification ritual that serves to channel public emotions 
and enables re-equilibration after a severe disturbance of the sociopolitical order. Crises reveal a 
“collapse of precautions that had hitherto been regarded culturally as adequate” (Turner, 1976, 
p. 380). Crises expose structural inadequacies that not only need repair but also require some form 
of retribution. Purification ritual may sound benign, but the blame games that ensue in the process 
may not always do justice to those involved, nor does it always facilitate a truth-finding dialogue or 
learning process in the wake of a crisis. 
Various accountability narratives compete for attention, and their advocates engage in escalating 
debates so that their version becomes dominant in public and political perception of the truth. Crisis-
induced accountability debates center on three key questions: (a) the origins of the crisis: How could 
this have happened in the first place?; (b) the response to the crisis: Was it appropriate and 
sufficient?; and (c) the lessons that can be drawn from this event: What political and policy 
implications should it have? (Brändström, 2016). The competing answers to those questions often 
imply responsibility and blame. 
The stakes are high for those slated with responsibility. Their power, reputation and careers, and/or 
the continuity of their organizations are at stake. The negativity bias among stakeholders (blame for 
potential losses outweighs credit for gains) instructs executives in political and organizational life to 
blame others and avoid blame themselves (Weaver, 1986). 
The potential for negativity bias is especially acute in crises, since constituents are generally worse 
off than when the crisis begins, so that the reference point for citizens is the degree of loss suffered. 
All of these factors make crises an ideal setting to study blame. . . . (Moynihan, 2012, p. 573, cf. 
Maestas, Atkeson, Croom, & Bryant, 2008) 
The article’s review of the literature on crises and accountability draws heavily on blame avoidance 
research. After all, “public systems of accountability are centered on the desire to blame” (Maestas 
et al., 2008; Moynihan, 2012, p. 569; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000). Blame avoidance studies, departing 
from Kent Weaver’s seminal work in 1986, abound in comparative welfare state research, on the one 
hand (focusing on ex ante arrangements to avoid blame for unpopular policy decisions, cf. Green-
Pedersen, 2002; Pierson, 1994; Vis, 2016), and on public policy and administration research, on the 
other (Hinterleitner, 2017). The latter branch of research includes many studies pertaining to a 
range, from human-made political crises and policy failures to natural and industrial disasters (e.g., 
Boin, ‘t Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015; Hood, 
2002; Hood et al., 2009). 
This article provides an overview of the academic discussions on accountability and blame 
management in response to crises. There is a vast literature on accountability and blaming, but this 
article zooms in on crisis situations in particular, which both limits and broadens the scope. The focus 
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here is on crises that fit the classic definition as highly negative and disruptive events or episodes 
characterized by threat, urgency, and uncertainty (Rosenthal Charles, & ‘t Hart, 1989). This focus 
makes the scope more limited than generic accountability studies in the sense that it excludes 
discussing accountability for routine government and policy performance. It includes insights from 
the public relations literature on private sector crisis accountability and therefore is broader than 
many of the above-cited public sector accountability approaches. 
This article reviews the crisis accountability literature in terms of forums, actors, and consequences 
(in line with previous work—see Kuipers & ‘t Hart’s [2014] conceptualization based on Bovens, 2010). 
This setup allows a systematic discussion of how crises impact the accountability process in 
influencing its setting (the forum); the strategies of accountees and their opponents (actors); and the 
resulting outcomes in terms of reputation damage, sanctions, and restoration (consequences). When 
does accounting turn into accusing, and to what end? What are the key dynamics of blame games in 
the wake of crises, as a result of the interplay between forums, actors, and outcomes? 
Institutional Impact: Forums 
Similar to the way emergency services rush to the site of an accident, organizational watchdogs and 
investigative forums are spurred into action when incidents have occurred that warrant 
accountability. Forums can be divided into four categories according to their sphere of influence or 
authority: (a) media, (b) investigators, (c) judicial authorities, and (d) political inquiries (Kuipers & ‘t 
Hart, 2014; cf. McConnell, 2010). Here a distinction is made between formal and informal 
accountability forums, with the media being an almost exclusively informal forum and the other 
three categories having formal authority over accountability assessments. What can be seen is that, 
through the presence of formal authorities in media reporting, and because media frames influence 
the work of formal authorities, the different forums interact in accountability processes. 
Media 
Informal, or non-governmental, forums would typically include both traditional and social media but 
also non-government organizations (NGOs), citizen journalism collectives (think of the Bellingcat 
collective, Global Voices, or the Independent Media Center), and publication outlets of independent 
authors, journalists, and academic scholars. Many studies on blaming strategies in the more formal 
political arena show how media influence interactions between political opponents (Brändström, 
Kuipers, & Daléus, 2008; Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015; Hood et al., 2009; Hood, Jennings, & Copeland, 
2016; Resodihardjo, Carroll, Van Eijk, & Maris, 2016; Stark, 2011). A rare study on blame avoidance in 
a nondemocratic regime (China) shows how authorities there face a pronounced trade-off between 
media transparency and secrecy in crisis management, with strong implications for formal 
accountability (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2016. 
Media not only play a direct role as a forum that holds “the powers that be” accountable, but they 
also provide an informal venue for framing and blaming by formal actors. Particularly as an informal 
venue, the influence of social media has expanded considerably in the past decade. The use of social 
media platforms in attempt to impact political processes has profoundly influenced elections in 
Europe and the United States. Some social media enjoy more direct attention by formal actors (such 
as U.S. president Trump) than their traditional counterparts, for political and blame management 
purposes. Social media incorporate a wider range of users, including citizens beyond the reach of 
newspapers and national television, such as teenagers but also potential voters (Wukich, 2019). 
Social media platforms have become useful tools for actors seeking to construct or spread fake or 
misrepresented news with the aim of influencing a specific issue or process, sometimes with political 
purposes. Social media can be exploited as an effective machinery with increasing speed and 
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targeted direction. For decision-makers, social media create a new arena in which they may have to 
defend or shape perceptions around a certain issue. 
However, the rules of engagement in this forum seem to be different from politics as it has been 
known. It is not necessarily beneficial to get engaged at all because interactions give rise to even 
more attention to the issue and may be exploited. This is very different from other arenas where 
politics and blame are managed, where active engagement is usually a recommended strategy over 
silence. The specific role of social media actors in crisis research in general, but particularly on 
influencing blame games and accountability for crisis, is under-researched, but its importance is likely 
to increase to those involved (Kuipers & Welsh, 2017). 
Kuipers and ‘t Hart identify four reasons why accusations and blame games escalate through mass 
media. First, blame games are more likely if a credible account of the causes of a crisis or the crisis 
response is lacking, or if something “fishy” emerged in public reporting and interpretation (Kuipers & 
‘t Hart, 2014, p. 591). It could be that incriminating information was not fully disclosed initially; 
alternative truths were exposed as being downright untrue; smoking guns were discovered; or 
hidden agendas and questionable motives revealed. Second, the lack of a bigger story may 
contribute to increased or continued media scrutiny. When there is nothing today to make the crisis 
yesterday’s news, media benefit from digging further in the case at hand. Third, related, it is perfectly 
rational and commercially rewarding for media to use their limited resources on expanding and 
deepening their reporting on a particular crisis and its more endemic causes and consequences. 
Fourth and finally, visibility of the crisis and its victims, or on-the-ground manifestations of a failed 
response and its results, adds fuel to the media fire. These four conditions (fishiness, lack of other 
news, rational search behavior by media, and visibility of failure) allow for zooming in on actors and 
failures, bring previously unearthed aspects in focus, and feed and prolong the accountability 
process. 
Professional reporters, NGO activists, and private citizens play a role in accountability and blaming 
through mass media as well. Of course, NGOs, particularly those who serve as critical watchdogs on 
human rights, have always been investigating the activities of authorities, side by side with 
journalism. In doing so, they collected and analyzed eye-witness accounts, physical proof, and 
incriminating documentation to find out what happened and to attribute responsibility. They long 
served as informal accountability forums. Some activists even create media hoaxes, such as the 
activists called the Yes Men, impersonating a company official stating that Dow Chemicals would 
finally take responsibility to compensate victims of the Bhopal disaster at the 20th anniversary of the 
disaster. The hoax was broadcasted by BBC news at prime time, causing a temporary wipe of $20 
billion off Dow’s share value, before the “Dow spokesman” was unmasked as a fraudster (Graff, 
2004, pp. 12–13). And ever since, these activists have more new technologies at their disposal. 
Digitalization of files allows individual activists (think of Julian Assange and Wikileaks, Edward 
Snowden and the NSA) to expose government top secrets. Publicly accessible satellite imagery is 
being examined in detail by Internet sleuths on a mission to reveal what governments are doing on 
the ground (Clem, 2016). Sometimes their work even threatens to interfere with other, more formal 
accountability forums such as the joint investigation team working on the prosecution of those 
responsible for the crash of flight MH-17 near Donetsk, Ukraine. When the Bellingcat collective 
publicly “compiled a very convincing case [which] revealed evidence about who shot the plane and 
how” (Clem, 2016), it also complicated the work of prosecutors and judges who could not allow 
external journalistic accounts to color their judgment. 
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In July 2018, cooperation between a Dutch online news magazine and the Bellingcat collective 
revealed that defense ministry staff used a fitness app on their smartphones that leaked the names, 
addresses, and whereabouts of soldiers and secret agents (Martijn, Tokmetzis, Bol, & Postmas, 
2018). Along with revealing their findings publicly, they held the Dutch government to account for its 
omissions in protecting their staff. Satellite imagery and new technologies for data mining form a 
powerful combination with globally networked wikisites and social media, and the ubiquity of smart 
digital telecom devices. As such, these ICT advancements “shift power to the newly informed” 
(Florini & Dehqanzada, 1999, p. 46). In response, Florini and Dehqanzada (1999, p. 52) argue that for 
authorities “the only practical choice is to embrace emerging transparency, take advantage of its 
positive effects and learn to manage its negative consequences.” And authorities better do so 
because “little brothers” are watching them with increasing resources in their hands (Clem, 2016). 
Accident Investigators 
Accidents are not always crises for the larger society where they occur. That is, the consequences are 
sometimes limited to those directly affected, and the incident does not politicize or take on “focusing 
event” qualities (Birkland, 2007 Brändström & Kuipers 2003). Catastrophic incidents such as the 
Herald of Free Enterprise (1987), Estonia (1994), and Costa Concordia (2012) shipping disasters; or 
tragedies in aviation such as the Tenerife disaster (1977), the Ueberlingen mid-air collision (2002), 
the Germanwings crash (2015), or the downing of flight MH-17 in Ukraine (2014) have become 
markers in the history of their transportation sector. Such accidents can expose structural 
deficiencies or spark off a debate on what we define as acceptable risks. In such cases, accident 
investigators and their conclusions suddenly have an inadvertent role in a politicized debate. 
Formal accident investigations by regulatory bodies, inspectorates, and accident investigation boards 
are traditionally the authorities to analyze the causes of accidents, incidents (including near misses), 
and disasters. The investigators differ in terms of scope and mandate, and their presence and 
jurisdiction also vary between countries and functional domains. They provide an account of causes 
with the objective of learning from failure and improving operations and safeguards to increase 
safety in the future. They face the following challenges: (a) non-exclusivity, (b) impact from other 
accountability processes, (c) proliferation of competing accounts, and (d) the continuous tension 
between learning and accusing. 
First of all, their search domain is not exclusive: investigators sometimes compete to provide their 
specific account of (aspects of) the same situation. They may even literally get in one another’s way 
on the accident site, as was the case with different investigative bodies in the aftermath of the crash 
of Turkish airlines flight TK1951 (IOOV report, 2009, p. 56). Occupational health and safety 
inspectorates stand side by side with safety boards and other transportation accident investigators, 
manufacturers (e.g., Boeing or Airbus), environmental protection agencies, chemical or nuclear 
safety agencies, and many more, to investigate, for instance, a single crash site. 
Second, their work is affected by the verdicts of others. Even if they coordinate their investigations in 
order not to hinder one another, their findings and conclusions will likely affect the reports and 
findings of others. Third, their number seems to be on the rise for single incidents. In response to 
external investigations, responsible authorities under investigation often commission an internal 
investigation on top of it all. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) explicitly recognized this trend in its 2018 
publication on independent investigations (DSB, 2018). The increase in accountability arrangements 
and the growing complexity thereof comes at a cost: “Almost by definition, multiple accountability is 
seen as too much of a good thing, as a burdensome overload” (Schillemans & Bovens, 2011, p. 1). 
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The fourth and final challenge discussed here is perhaps most important with respect to blaming: 
each investigation, even if purely focused on learning and improvement, makes those responsible for 
whatever has contributed to the incident at hand stand accused. Catino (2008) concludes from his 
literature review that “though favored by scientists, the organizational function approach [focused 
on learning from accident investigations] is in real life often beaten by the individual blame logic [the 
accusatory approach to accident investigation]” (Catino, 2008, p. 53). Elliott and McGuinness (2002, 
p. 20) agree in their article on accident investigations’ propensity to (indirectly) blame individuals and 
agencies, even if the purpose of the investigators is to draw lessons and prevent future crises. After 
all, “any identification of human error will at the very least encourage the pursuit of subsequent 
litigation.” 
Judicial Forums 
Though formally separate processes, it is unlikely that judicial authorities, prosecutors, or coroners 
will ignore the outcomes of accident investigations. Their primary aim is, however, not just to 
establish causality, but in fact to ascertain responsibility and culpability. Kuipers and ‘t Hart (2014, 
p. 592) call this the “forensic paradigm of accountability.” Similar to accounts by media and 
professional investigators, judicial forums and their findings can break careers of those involved at all 
levels in the accident or its causes. What characterizes judicial processes is their high cost in terms of 
money and time. Crises cast a long legal shadow, and the costs are extreme. 
Although professional accident investigation processes are usually completed within one or two 
years after an incident, and political inquiries may take even longer, judicial trials trump them all (see 
Brändström & Kuipers, 2003; Elliott & McGuinness, 2002, p. 19). The settlement of the 1984 Union 
Carbide toxic disaster in Bhopal took more than 20 years in the Indian and U.S. courts. The trials of 
the 1989 Hillsborough Football Stadium disaster are still running in the U.K. courts 30 years after the 
incident (BBC, 2018). The BP oil spill was finally settled for $20 billion by the U.S. Federal Court in 
2016, six years after the incident in 2010. “This might not be the end of legal troubles for BP, 
however. The company is facing yet another lawsuit related to the spill—in Mexico” (“BP Oil Spill,” 
2016). Also, public health investigations on the effects of the clean-up on local workers’ health are 
still ongoing and may lead to new judicial charges (Konkel, 2018). Unfortunately, unlike companies 
and governments, individual victims do not always have the time and resources to see the blame 
materialize in judicial trials. For instance, many Hillsborough witnesses and victims’ relatives died 
during the trial process (Conn, 2018). 
Political Inquiries 
A typical response to unfortunate events, scandals, or policy failures is to launch an inquiry by a blue-
ribbon committee, royal commission, or other independent inquisitor (Boin et al., 2009). Elliott and 
McGuinness (2002, p. 14) to assess the usefulness of “an instrument born of the late 19th century” 
(the public inquiry) for evaluating contemporary crisis management by criticizing the (a) impartiality, 
(b) scope and process, and (c) the underlying purposes of political inquiries. Most of their criticism on 
implications for learning, in fact, holds equal implications for blame management. 
Impartiality: Elliot and McGuiness (2002) point out that governments usually seek to distance 
themselves from the inquiry by appointing independent investigators. Political incumbents need to 
avoid the impression of setting up an inquiry committee just to clean their slate, so they select 
committee members of impeccable reputation and in possession of nonpartisan credentials (Kuipers 
& ‘t Hart, 2014, p. 592). In a comparative study of 15 crisis cases, Boin et al. found that incumbent 
politicians did what they could to “prevent the inquiry from being run in the adversarial, politicized 
legislative arena,” resulting in the majority of inquiries being commissioned to blue-ribbon 
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committees or senior lawyers (Boin et al., 2009, p. 98). Though such committees were still highly 
critical of their own government, their expert-driven inquiries tended to focus on “regulatory, 
managerial and cultural factors” and they were less likely to result in political fatalities (Boin et al., 
2009, p. 98). 
However, true impartiality of inquiries, even by so-called independent investigators, is not self-
evident. Elliott and McGuiness (2002) criticize the unrepresentative selection of committee members 
(they may in fact only represent the elite because of their credentials and reputation) and emphasize 
that not only their elite status but also their disciplinary background (judges, in the United Kingdom) 
may influence their inquiry. Even if impartiality of an inquiry committee could be established, it 
seems to no avail for blame avoidance purposes. An empirical study by Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2006) 
shows how independent inquiries not only fail to reduce blame attribution in general, but they are 
also considered no more credible than partisan inquiries unless their conclusions are very negative of 
incumbent actors. 
Scope and process: When commissioning an inquiry, authorities also influence the scope from the 
outset. Historical evidence shows that if, for instance, concerns about hooliganism are dominating 
the political agenda, an inquiry into a football stadium disaster may be very much cast in that light, 
not only distracting from underlying problems such as crowd control but also attributing 
responsibility at a particular level (the hooligans, not the custodians) (see Elliott & McGuiness 2002; 
Elliott & Smith, 1993). The scope may not only be set and biased from a specific perspective, but it 
may also be too narrow—focusing on immediate, technical causes—to take into account the more 
structural, endemic policies that contributed to failure (Hutter, 1992, cf. Brändström & Kuipers, 
2003). The inquiry process takes time, which makes sense in terms of quality and thoroughness but 
also can impede political accountability. When years pass between the incident, the commissioning 
of an inquiry, and the presentation of its conclusions, the responsible actors may be long gone from 
the political scene, leaving it to the new political incumbents to account for their predecessors. 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2007, p. 642) shows that political executives do not per se need to establish 
inquiries to buy time when they find themselves subject of criticism and blame. Media salience also 
subsides after an attention peak of three weeks for similar issues that are not followed up with an 
inquiry (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2007). 
Underlying purposes: Although inquiries often formally solely focus on learning and truth finding, 
their identification of failure will most likely influence blame attribution. This may not be their 
purpose, but it is such a persistent and ubiquitous side effect that it cannot be ignored. In terms of 
blame avoidance, as Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2010, p. 631) shows, inquiries are fundamentally negative 
goods for political executives. Their impartiality is by definition contested (Elliott & McGuiness 2002; 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2006); the time bought by kicking the ball in the long grass is inconsequential for 
escalation of the blame game (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2007); and their conclusions will likely increase the 
attribution of blame (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010). Incumbents will need to consider other blame 
management strategies. The next section, “Actors and Their Strategies” therefore discusses research 
findings on actors and their strategic responses or orientations to blame. 
Actors and Their Strategies 
The increased mediatized visibility of crises and leaders, combined with the drive for more 
transparency, learning, and inquiry, have made the role of actors during crises and their aftermath 
more important and personal. In addition, trans-boundary crises imply that multiple agency 
involvement in crisis causes or responses, and hence the number of actors and organizations in 
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blame games, is on the increase. Different disciplines in crisis research reveal a trend toward more 
attention for actors and their strategies, and meanwhile bring a variety of insights to the table. 
Crisis research from an international relations or more generic political science perspective has 
always had a focus on leaders and their responsibilities. Foreign policy crises such as the Cuban 
missile crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the intrusion of a Russian submarine into Swedish 
territorial waters pointed at the key roles of leaders and their administrations (Brändström, 2016). As 
a result, actors and blame attribution were a natural topic of interest when foreign policy failures 
became apparent (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1998; Ellis, 1994; Kuipers et al., 2011; Walsh, 2006). Political 
science studies originally focusing on democratic accountability more generally showed how crises 
are pivotal in shaping and bringing to life formal and informal institutional rules and norms (Stark, 
2011). 
Crisis studies originating from disaster sociology and public administration came to conclude that 
crises cast long shadows. Crises profoundly affect legitimacy, trust, and risk perception, which 
brought in meaning-making and accountability as critical leadership tasks (Boin et al., 2005). 
In judging the success or otherwise of crisis management initiatives it is tempting to focus on 
individuals . . . especially because they ‘humanise’ the crisis management process, often attracting 
media attention for the better (President Piñera and the rescue of the Chilean miners) or worse 
(FEMA chief Michael Brown and hurricane Katrina). (McConnell, 2011, p. 65) 
Crises need a face, and political executives provide those. Most studies acknowledge that crisis 
managers encounter a “mission impossible” and that fair judgments are scarce (Boin, Kuipers, & 
Overdijk, 2013; Boin & ‘t Hart, 2003; McConnell, 2011). Yet, the incentives and occasions for blaming 
(other) actors, and the challenges to actors in terms of blame avoidance, abound. 
Studies combining crisis research with a focus on policy networks and political delegation point out 
that not only individual actors face blame in crisis. Moynihan (2012) made an important contribution 
to the literature by describing the increasing importance of crisis response networks as subjects of 
blame and venues for blame avoidance. Agencies at arm’s length of ministerial departments seem to 
be apt designs for blame avoidance by separating policy implementation from direct political 
responsibility (Hood, 2002). Hood (2011) even refers to such designs as the “agency strategy” for 
blame avoidance. 
The chance of success of delegating blame away from the principal, or diffusing blame in a network, 
is subject to debate. Empirical studies of high-profile policy failures showed that even at arms’ 
length, agents turn on their political principals when things go wrong (Hood & Lodge, 2006). 
Moynihan (2012) even argues that independent agencies in crisis are more likely to blame their 
remote principals than previously, when they were integral parts of cabinet departments. Agencies 
and public managers with more attenuated relationships to the political principal have more 
incentives to avoid blame, and pass the buck upward in the delegation chain. Although their own 
organizational reputation is immediately at stake, their loyalty to remote partners or superiors in 
their network is not so strong. In addition, agencification and network governance increase the 
number of actors involved in a crisis response, and hence the number of potential participants in the 
blame game goes up, which may add fuel to the fire (Moynihan, 2012). Similar arguments have been 
made about multilevel governance responses and blame avoidance in geographically decentralized 
systems (Maestas et al., 2008; Mortensen, 2013). 
In sum, the role of actors can be seen as becoming more important and more personal, and their 
number in blame games is on the increase. It can also be concluded that most studies treat 
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motivations for actors in blame games as a given—in line with Weaver’s (1986). Central to empirical 
research on actors in blame games and accountability processes hitherto were the strategies these 
actors employ. “Strategies: Dimensions and Stages” looks into those tactics and the mechanisms of 
escalation that make some accountability processes develop into highly politicized blame games, and 
others not. 
Strategies: Dimensions and Stages 
To avoid risk and blame, actors can choose between different basic strategies, including 
presentational, agency, and policy strategies (Hood, 2002). The latter two are anticipatory strategies 
that actors design into their system of responsibility (limiting formal responsibility for policy 
substance, the policy strategy) and accountability (shifting responsibility for policy implementation to 
others, the agency strategy) (Hinterleitner, 2017). The presentational strategy is a post-hoc and 
rhetorical one. When an event has already occurred, actors can no longer “organize” themselves out 
of trouble by means of limiting discretion or advocating delegation, they need to rely on denial or 
framing. Opponents, in turn, will position themselves to allocate blame toward incumbent actors and 
coalitions. 
The governance literature on blame focuses on two distinct presentational strategies: blame 
avoidance and blame management (McGraw, 1991). Blame avoidance studies emphasize denial. The 
argument here is that political actors are most likely to initially attempt to deny responsibility for the 
unfortunate event, problematic response, or policy failure. Hood et al. (2009) coined the term 
“staged retreat,” a strategy that entails consecutive steps starting with denial of the problem; then 
resorting to denial of responsibility for it; and only if all else fails, admitting both problem and 
responsibility (see also Hood, 2011; Resodihardjo et al., 2016; Resodihardjo, van Eijk, & Carroll, 2012; 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan & Hood, 2005). 
Blame management strategies are characterized by framing. To frame is “to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to provide a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment 
recommendation . . .” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Framing occurs along several dimensions: severity (Why 
is this so bad?), agency (Is this a structural policy problem or an operational incident?) and 
responsibility (At what level and on whose watch did it occur?) (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003). Media 
are experts in framing, but so are politicians and agency administrators of all stripes and colors. 
The blame game involves not only those who defend themselves but also active predators, 
particularly but not exclusively so in majoritarian political systems (Boin et al., 2009; Brändström, 
2016; De Ruiter, 2017; Hinterleitner, 2017, p. 222). Negative events are not blameworthy by 
definition, but they are often made blameworthy by political opponents framing the issue as such. 
Their motivations can vary, from preemptively striking in order to avoid blame on their own turf, to 
deliberately weakening the reputation of opponents or politicizing a policy practice in order to 
centralize authority. Hinterleitner (2018) provides a compelling account of the latter in his analysis of 
a politicized case of the implementation of a Swiss juvenile justice policy. Other case studies reveal 
the deliberate mutual attacks between political parties, levels, and branches of government, such as 
after hurricane Katrina (Boin et al., 2010; Moynihan, 2012), the Iraq Wheat scandal (McConnell, 
Gauja, & Botterill, 2008), the Boxing day tsunami (Brändström et al., 2008), the Australian home 
insulation policy fiasco (Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015), and the Abu Ghraib scandal (Kuipers et al., 
2011). 
Though accountability processes can suffer from “the problem of many hands” when responsibility is 
diluted (Thompson, 1967, the above cases point at patterns and mechanisms of escalation. The more 
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actors involved in both blaming and receiving blame, and the more domains of responsibility are 
implicated, the more fuel on the blame game and the politicization of the situation at hand 
(Brändström et al., 2008). What further fuels escalation are the characteristics of the issue and the 
particular setting in which a crisis occurs (such as election time, or the composition of government 
coalitions or composition of collaborative networks) (Boin et al., 2009). 
The public governance and crisis management literature has learned much from the business 
administration domain on how crisis characteristics and context affect blame attribution. Public 
affairs scholars have long investigated how pre-crisis reputation, crisis history, and organizational 
reputation affect the attribution of responsibility for the next event (Coombs, 2007). Hearit (2006) 
and Benoit (1995) point out that aspects such as visibility (of the damage or suffering), excusability 
(values violated, perceived intentionality), and identification with victims, make some crises worse 
than others as amplifiers of blame. The public affairs literature has contributed much on crisis 
mitigation and damage control because of its focus on the consequences of crises in terms of blame 
attribution. The next section, “Consequences,” discusses how accountability of public actors and 
their organizations for crises translates into consequences. 
Consequences 
Sanctions and Resignations 
The outcomes of blame games can generate a wide range of consequences to individual 
organizations or officeholders; scapegoating lower-level operators, singling out failed policymaking 
or policymakers, or revealing fundamentally flawed systems of policymaking and operations. Studies 
of blame management have also demonstrated that responsibility and blame seem to move up the 
ladder of hierarchy once put in motion. Hence the stakes for top office holders are particularly high 
(Boin et al., 2009; Brändström, 2016). 
The success for individual actors in influencing the outcome of such blame games are shaped by 
institutional settings (e.g., the parliamentary system) as well as their individual skills in managing and 
positioning themselves with regard to accountability (De Ruiter, 2019). Both the institutional and the 
individual perspectives are crucial in understanding the sanctions that may follow on blame games 
(Brändström, 2016). According to Moynihan (2012, p. 569), Maestas et al. (2008), and others, our 
public accountability systems are increasingly focused on assigning blame. Hence, demands for 
resignations as a remedy also seem to increase (Hinterleitner & Sager, 2019 p. 134; Weaver, 2018). 
When the Swedish transportation agency had outsourced digital data platforms that were accessible 
to a foreign company without what appeared to be the proper security clearance, the head of the 
agency was forced to resign. The critique against the government continued and subsequently led to 
the resignation of two cabinet ministers (“Transportstyrelsens it-affär,” 2017). 
The tenure of political leaders in general has long been of interest to public policy studies (Hansen, 
Klemmensen, Hobolt, & Bäck, 2013; Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2005). Their findings also 
provide important perspectives regarding the more specific relationship between crisis accountability 
and resignations of politically appointed leaders. In Western parliamentary democracies, the 
accountability relationship stems from the chain of delegation linking the electorate to individual 
political executives through parliament (Ström, 2003). Accountability and sanctions follow this 
delegation, and the government is ultimately evaluated through elections. In this perspective, how 
long a political actor manages to stay in office is ultimately determined by those parties who have 
decided to form the coalition government (Mesquita et al., 2005). However, Mesquita et al. (2005) 
also conclude that the situational and political context are equally important for the tenure of 
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political leaders. Crises are important markers with respect to the situational context in which we 
assess the performance of political executives. 
The reasons why political leaders resign in general vary. Woodhouse (2004) and Dowding and Lewis 
(2012) suggest that failure to perform in one’s role (in relation to parliament) and natural causes 
(age, illness) are primary causes for resignation. Ministerial drift—moving too far away from the 
agreed-on party or policy line—may be another cause for resignation (Indridason & Kam, 2008). 
Ministers can also be “called” or forced to resign because of a breach of trust with the prime 
minister, personal scandals, or a mismanaged crisis (Bäck, Meier, Persson, & Fischer, 2012; Bovens, 
2010; Dowding & Lewis, 2012). The consequences of crisis can follow near instantaneously or years 
down the road. For instance, Spain’s Prime Minister Aznar was voted out of office three days after 
the Madrid bombings in 2004 when he was accused of misleading the public about the cause of the 
attacks (Canel, 2012). The entire Dutch cabinet stepped down years after a crisis (in 2002) when an 
inquiry committee concluded that the Dutch government had to take responsibility for the failed UN 
protection of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995 (Brändström & Kuipers, 2003). 
The setting in which a crisis occurs has a profound impact on political sanctions. Most scholars agree 
that cases of resignation often correlate with intense and negative media scrutiny (Boin et al., 2005; 
Dowding & Lewis, 2012; Woodhouse, 2004). When precisely a crisis hits in the electoral cycle also 
affects the likelihood and the intensity of blame games (Boin, McConnell, & ‘t Hart, 2008). Individual 
characteristics such as personal and professional backgrounds, age, gender, political capital, and 
prior experiences of the actors involved greatly influence how well they cope with pressures to resign 
(Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2007; Daléus, 2012). 
Studies in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany indicate that political experience (in parliament or 
cabinet) is a factor that protects ministers from having to leave office (see Bäck, Persson, & Meier, 
2009; De Ruiter, 2019; Fischer & Kaiser, 2009). Leaders with a better understanding of the rules and 
procedures of the political arena are simply better at exploiting them to their advantage. The relative 
importance of a minister to the prime minister and his or her power position in the party and/or 
cabinet also seem important as protection from resignations (Dowding & McLeay, 2011). Factors 
such as leadership capital and pre-crisis credibility are important factors also for the tenure of 
political leaders (Bennister, ‘t Hart, & Worthy, 2015). Research on Swedish post-crisis resignations 
support the notion that a political power position and relative importance to the prime minister 
exceeds prior mistakes. In the Swedish cases, parliament could not independently enforce 
resignations of ministers. A necessary factor seemed to be decreasing public and cabinet support. 
Calls for resignations were usually initiated by the prime minister in order to secure the stability of 
cabinet and government (see Brändström, 2016). 
The public inclination to assign responsibility for crises in combination with expectations of 
resignations will place individual actors at the heart of the blame game. Given the potential 
consequences, we can assume that actors tend to expand their toolbox to manage blame and 
sanctions in order to avoid the most unwanted consequences, including pressures to resign. In the 
next section, we discuss “Image Restoration” as a perhaps more positive outcome of crisis 
accountability. 
Image Restoration 
Though reputations can be partly repaired, once an accountable executive stands accused of 
mishandling a crisis, tolerance for future missteps is gone (De Ruiter, 2019). The one factor that 
seems to have a real shielding effect is a current political power position that exceeds prior mistakes 
(Brändström, 2016, p. 124). Though Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding (2010) concluded from a 
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longitudinal study that most calls for political sanctions do not in fact lead to direct resignation, the 
damage to the executive’s reputation makes remaining in office difficult. Only 30% of the executives 
who faced one or more resignation calls ultimately complete their term (Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 563; 
Kuipers & ‘t Hart, 2014). Subsequent performance will be scrutinized more intensely or less 
forgivingly, and in particular a next crisis is likely to nail the coffin (De Ruiter, 2019). 
The public affairs literature is more optimistic. Self-disclosure of mishaps and failures help to reduce 
the attribution of blame (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012). Apologies, 
corrective action, and mortification can help corporations and their executives to bounce back 
strongly. As long as their response to the reputational threat or accusation is commensurate to the 
scope and intensity of the threat, recovery and regaining of trust is possible (Benoit, 1995). 
To respond appropriately to a reputational threat, the threat first needs to be assessed accurately. 
Coombs (2007) advises that such an assessment includes whether the current issue is related—in the 
perception of stakeholders—to any previous negative events (the crisis history of the accused). Also, 
the organization under fire should do some soul-searching on how it has been treating its 
stakeholders in the past (the distinctiveness of the wrongdoings). In combination with the alleged 
intentionality of the issue at hand, the pre-crisis reputation defines the severity of the blame 
attribution. High perception of intentionality combined with damaged pre-crisis reputation requires 
more efforts to compensate the damage, apologize, and reach out, than scandals that are “first 
offences” against the backdrop of an otherwise impeccable reputation (Coombs, 2007). Though this 
line of argument seems to state the obvious, many corporate actors—similar to politicians—
miscalculate or underestimate the reputation threat or blame they face and try to “get away” with 
initial denial or minimal compensatory efforts to the affected, making matters worse in the public 
eye. 
A meta study by Arendt, LaFleche, and Limperopulos (2017) reveals that denial is the least effective 
strategy, yet the one most commonly used by organizations in response to threats and blame. 
Instead, corrective action—one of Benoit’s famous strategies for image repair—is the most 
successful (Arendt et al., 2017; Benoit, 1995). Case studies of organizations that respond generously 
or even overcompensate show that accusations can be turned into opportunities, such as IKEA’s 
response to the discovery of horsemeat in its famous meatballs in 2013 (Bik, Ngai, & Falkheimer, 
2017). 
Though few would argue that there are important differences between the public sector and the 
corporate sphere, it is striking how students of political science and public administration seem to 
focus mostly on blame management, whereas business administration scholars in public relations 
focus more on image repair and apologia. So much so even, that leading corporate crisis 
communication scholars Ulmer and Sellnow (2002, p. 362) lamented that “crisis-related discourse is 
most often about an organization or industry absolving itself from guilt and repairing its image” using 
the apologia toolkit. These apologia can repair the reputation damage after product recalls and 
corporate scandals and are therefore instrumental to recover a brand’s popularity as soon as 
possible. Yet such repair strategies do not per se improve the position of the organization more 
structurally. In crises with an external cause (such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters), Ulmer and 
Sellnow argue that opportunities arise to replace the discourse of apology with emphasis on 
rebuilding and renewal (2002). This argument is in line with studies on crisis management in the 
public sector that focus on crisis exploitation (Boin et al., 2009) and institutional renewal (Ansell, 




This article systematically discussed how crises impact the accountability process in terms of its 
setting (the forum); the strategies of blame avoidance by those involved (actors); and the effects of 
blame and blame avoidance or apology strategies in terms of reputation damage, sanctions, and 
restoration (consequences). In recapping this discussion, important avenues for future research can 
be found with regards to the role of the diversification and direct impact of social media on the crisis 
accountability process. As Stern (2017) puts it, 
The rise of social media and personal communications technology . . . has profound implications for 
the accountability process. The media, public sector accountability fora, and other actors in public 
discourse are now provided with real time information, competing accounts regarding incidents, and 
feedback (though not necessarily sound, systematic, or reliable) regarding citizen reactions and 
satisfaction with services provided by crisis actors. In other words, the scope, complexity, granularity, 
and accessibility of accountability-relevant information have increased dramatically. (Stern, 2017, 
p. 6) 
Although the (social) media are themselves almost exclusively informal forums of accountability, they 
seem to have considerable impact on the work of accident investigators, judicial forums, and political 
inquiries having formal authority over accountability assessments. Not only do social media report 
and criticize on the work of these forums before the investigation is completed, they are also 
increasingly important channels of crowdsourced data and findings that may or may not positively 
contribute to the work of investigators, prosecutors, or inquiry committees. In addition, they are 
venues for disinformation, controversy, and ambiguity that compete for political and public attention 
at unprecedented levels. Future research on how social media play a role in influencing the work of 
different crisis accountability forums would be highly valuable. 
Looking at accountability strategies reveals that the number of actors involved in blame games is 
likely rising because of increasingly networked crisis responses. Also, the role of actors has become 
more important and personal in the crisis aftermath and accountability process. Social media provide 
more information than ever before on responsible actors’ actions and on their popularity. Political 
executives are easily being photographed and personally exposed in settings, places, and contexts 
that can be considered as inappropriate during the crisis response phase (the Dutch prime minister 
on a sunny terrace in shorts in the week after the downing of flight MH17, or Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice shopping at Manolo Blahnik’s on the day after hurricane Katrina made landfall). 
Media appearances in individual or consecutive crisis situations form an easy and visible trail. Media 
provide immediate criticism and feedback on the popularity of actions by public leaders, which may 
be difficult to keep up with in terms of response or difficult to curb once a particular image or picture 
has gone viral. The impact of social media on the more personal nature of accountability processes 
could be another avenue for further study. 
The consequences and success of individual actors in influencing the accountability outcomes is 
shaped by both institutional settings and individual skills and strategies. A current political power 
position that exceeds prior mistakes is an effective shield, and denial is the least effective, though 
most commonly used, strategy. If social media make accountability processes more personal and 
direct, the impact of institutional settings on the consequences and success of blame avoidance 
strategies is likely to change. If the accountability process becomes more person than role focused, 
and more direct, it may result in a convergence of strategies in the public and private sector, in 
different political settings, with more similar outcomes. There is much to learn between the different 
literatures from the fields of business administration and public affairs, on the one hand, and political 




Accountability in times of crisis is a balancing act between rebuttal and repair. It takes place in a 
diversity of forums: media, accident investigations, judicial investigations, and political inquiries. Each 
of these forums offers different challenges for politically responsible actors in crisis, in terms of 
accountability. The strategies at their disposal vary from denial to complete mortification. There is 
more optimism in the private sector than in the political realm regarding the effect of these 
strategies. Both public and business administration scholars cynically agree that blaming as well as 
quickly apologizing gets in the way of structural improvements. At the same time, they also agree 
that renewal is possible and that accountability after crisis can play a crucial role here. 
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